I. Fisher provides a classical explanation of financial instability 2 . He argued that the instability is strongly correlated with macroeconomic cycles and the dynamic of the aggregate debt in an economy. Propelled by accumulation of an excessively large debt in the real sector problems lead to a situation in which one has to repay the debt to restore the equilibrium. The debt repayment subsequently triggers a fall in deposits and assets sales on a cheap. All these factors send growth rates in prices and output nosedive, as well as trigger a rise in unemployment and in the number of bankruptcies. So, Fisher believes that the main cause for financial turmoil is a negative dynamic of the fundamental indicators. Let us note that until today Russian researchers have undertaken just a few attempts to build the national financial sector monitoring indicators. More specifically, Struchenevsky 3 studies into the dynamic of macroeconomic parameters that describe the financial system's behavior in the period of normal development, pre-crisis periods, and directly in the times of financial crises in Russia. Plisetsky 4 recaps on the international record of forecasting of financial crises with the use on an early warning system. As well, a number of research was conducted in RF to build early indices designated for foreseeing a future economic dynamic. However, such works rested primarily on the qualitative analysis and were aimed at forecasting the situation in the real sector, rather than in the financial one. For example, Smirnov 5 puts forward a system of early indicators for Russia, which formed the basis for his calculations, which would enable one to arrive at certain conclusions regarding the economic dynamic in the country. In his paper, Ostapkovich 6 considers indicators different countries employed to build an aggregate early index. All the research papers that center on exposing the financial turmoil harbinger indicators can be classified into three groups, depending on the methodology employed, to identify the best indicators in question.
1. Qualitative analysis. The approach suggests a graphic comparison of the dynamics of the fundamental economic indicators on the eve of a financial crisis and in a normal state.
The most renown research in this direction by far have been works by J. Aziz, R. Salgado, J. Caprio, D. Klingebiel, F. Caramazzi 7 . 2. Econometric modeling. Under this approach, one builds econometric models to identify correlation between a given indicator and the probability of the financial crisis. Most often, the authors of these models (G. Corsetti, P. Pesenti, N. Rubini, A. Demirguc-Junt, M. Krueger, among others) 8 employed logit-analysis or probit-analysis, under which they test a regression model that mirrors correlation between the probability of a financial crisis and a series of economic indicators. The tested model is employed for forecasting the probability of the financial crisis. 3. Non-parametric testing. Under this approach, researchers design various numerical characteristics that allow an early identification of an economy's exposition to financial , whose contribution to this direction of research was most notable. In the frame of this approach one can single out two main directions -building threshold values of early warning indicators of the financial crisis on the basis of various criteria and designing aggregate financial stability indices. We believe that the qualitative analysis bears a great deal of subjectivity in interpretation of the indicators' dynamic. That is why it is imperative to develop some quantitative characteristics which would allow a greater objectivity of the monitoring of financial stability. An analysis of the global record in the financial stability monitoring allows one to argue that there exist two main ways of designing such characteristics. The first way is econometric modeling, i.e. testing binary choice models with different financial instability indicators that are employed as exogenous variables. But, because of a number of reasons, we consciously rejected such an analysis. First, our examination of the international record of building econometric models to assess the probability of the rise of financial instability, showed that, despite consideration of the same crisis episodes, different authors produce fairly different findings, both in terms of the best early warning indicators and in terms of selection of threshold values of the indicators. Choosing this or that econometric model to employ results of its testing for the purpose of the financial stability monitoring would not be far less subjective an exercise than a plain qualitative analysis of the indicators dynamic. Plus, none of the examined papers displayed any advantage borne by econometric testing vis-à-vis non-parametric methods. Secondly, because the binary choice models are non-linear, it appears hard to test the contribution of each regressor into growth of the probability of emergence of a financial instability in the event the actual value of the indicator significantly biases from the average one. Finally, to obtain statistically significant tests, a fairly big number of crisis episodes is needed. Until the crisis of the fall 2008, there had been only 4 episodes by which statistical data are available -namely, the August 1995 crisis on the interbank market, the stock market crisis in October 1997, a huge financial crisis in August 1998, and the crisis in confidence in the national banking system in May 2004. The existence of just 4 episodes clearly appears insufficient to test the binary selection model. Its testing on the panel data (i.e. with the use of data on cross-country crisis episodes), in our view, is undesirable, as it would significantly diminish the power of the criterion, according to which the probability of emergence of the financial instability is assessed. The fact of the matter is that, despite their common features, crises display numerous peculiarities determined by specificities of the respective economies. That is why the dynamic of the financial stability indicators on the eve of a crisis differs from country to country. So, due to the above reasons, we have opted for nonparametric methods. When compared with them, the econometric analysis methodology appears far more complex and requires fulfillment of a great number of premises with regard to the employed data. Meanwhile, the methodology we use is transparent, while its findings are easy to interpret. They, of course, have their limitations -more specifically, if the methods are implemented, it is harder to employ standard statistical tests. But we, anyway, believe that the balance of pros and cons of the nonparametric approach testifies to the fact that it appears more preferred over the other methods. Let us note that most papers that deal with forecasting of the unfolding of financial turmoil with the use of such methods employ the so-called "signal" approach 10 , first proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 11 back in 1998. However, it has not been tried by far to evaluate Russia's financial system. That is why we decided to adapt it to develop a system of leading indicators of financial instability on Russia's market, as well as to build an aggregate financial instability index for Russia.
Methodology of the Signal Approach
While realizing the signal-based approach, it is assumed there is the necessity to test zero hypothesis of the economy being in a normal state vis-à-vis an alternative hypothesis of the possibility of some financial turmoil within the upcoming three to six months. As in the course of testing of any statistical hypothesis, a threshold (critical value 12 ) should be picked. If a value of a given indicator goes beyond the preset threshold, the indicator is believed to send a signal. To select an optimal threshold value for each indicator, one needs to set up some criterion. It is the indicator that takes into account the balance between "bad" signals and "good' ones, which is used as such a criterion 13 . To build the indicator, let us break all its values into four groups (see Table 1 ). Needless to say, in the ideal case all its values will fit into cells A and D. Using Table 1 , it is easy to clarify the methodology of picking the marginal values. Let us identify an unconditional probability of the looming financial turmoil (1) for each indicator as the ratio of observations that were followed by the financial turmoil within 3 months to all observations.
Should the indicator send a great number of "good" signals, it can be expected that the probability of the rise of a financial instability on condition of the signal generation ) | ( S C P would be greater than the unconditional probability
That is to say, in order to make sense out of the use of the indicator in question for forecasting the emergence of financial instability, the following correlation should be complete:
Let us label this condition as the one necessary for selection of an optimal threshold value. Besides, while picking the threshold values, we minimized the "bad" signals to "good" ones ratio:
So, we considered all possible threshold values for each indicator over a maximum possible time period and opted for the threshold value under which the value of the indicator (4) was minimal, while condition (3) was observed with. Let us note that in a number of cases it may happen that the "bad"-to-"good" signal ratio accounts for zero, because the proportion of "bad" signals is zero, while the indicator is too insensitive, i.e. it does not send signals on the eve of a considerable number of crises. That is why, while selecting indicators and their threshold values, it is also imperative to remain attentive to the proportion of crises a given indicator heralds (let us denote it as PC) in the overall number of crises. o Money supply to gold and foreign exchange reserves ratio; o «Excess» money supply in real terms.  The index of pressure on the forex market. In most cases we employed increase rates of the indicators or considered their ratio to GDP, which enabled us to ensure the data consistency. At the same time, in a number of cases, for the sake of analysis we employed an indicator expressed on levels, as it was the form in which they demonstrated the greatest prognostic power. Table 2 comprises the description of modifications applied to the indicators, as well as periodicity of the data and their source. *Originally, this indicator constitutes the export prices to import prices ratio. However, because of the absence of export and import prices in Russia's statistics of balance of payment, this calculation is impossible. We considered, as an analogous indicator, the price dynamic for Brent. As oil forms one of main Russia's exports, the index of changes in its price, under the premise of a relatively unchanged prices for imports, may serve a fairly trustworthy indicator of the country's trade conditions. ** The IMF data base -International Financial Statistics (IFS) *** Net capital outflow is the balance of the capital flows account for banks and non-financial corporations, as well as net errors and omissions. Capital flight is characterized by the sum of trade credits and advance payments, export gains not repatriated on time, and net errors and omissions. A positive value of the indicators means capital inflow, while a negative one -capital outflow. **** We consider the amount of demand deposits, time deposits, saving deposits, and deposits denominated in foreign exchange. ***** An "excess" money supply in real terms constitutes a bias of the tested money supply from the observed money supply (in the form of the proportion of money supply in GDP), i.e. as a balance of the regression equation of the following form : 1) the monthly increase exchange rate of the domestic currency , E  ; 2) the increase rate in gold and foreign exchange reserves (with an inverse sign), R  ; 3) the interest rate level (for Russia -interest rate on the interbank lending market), i. The two latter items mirror the monetary authorities' policy on the forex market in the event a speculative attack on the national currency occurrs. It is assumed that under the fixed (regulated) exchange rate such an attack would lead to a fall in the nation's gold and forex reserves. On the other hand, under any forex regime, the central bank can raise interest rates to protect the national currency. It is considered while being included in the formula for the sake of calculation of the index of the third item. So, the index of "pressure on the forex market" is calculated as: 
Application of the above methodology of selecting early warning indicators of financial instability in RF allowed obtaining the results presented in Table 3 . The threshold values were built on the basis of evaluation of the data over the period between January 1994 and December 2006 (with account of their availability across individual indicators).
Table 3

Results of Employment of the Signal Approach
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Indicator
Threshold value Evaluation of the findings allows one to conclude that employment of all the indicators, except for net capital outflow, enables one to forecast the rise of financial instability with the probability rate being greater than the unconditional one. In other words, the employment of the proposed methodology gives a possibility to predict a financial instability, at least, better than with the use of frequency of the past financial crises, as the forecast, which, in our view forms a necessary condition of the indicator's efficiency. In addition, we propose to set a lower threshold of the excess of the conditional probability over the unconditional one at the level of 5 p.p. as the criterion of efficiency of an indicator. In this case, it will be 13 indicators that would for the group of efficient indicators, whose analysis would enable one to predict financial instability. Table 4 provides data on the state of the system of functional leading financial instability indicators on the eve of the past crisis episodes in RF. It can be noted from Table 4 that it was the financial crisis of August 1998, whose approaching was signaled by the greatest number of indicators. It should have been expected, as the magnitude of the crisis by far has been the greatest one. As concerns the other episodes, some 40% of indicators would set respective signals. But it may well happen that a proportion of indicators that signal the looming financial instability does not form the best aggregate indicator of financial stability in a country. In other words, as the number of the examined indicators is sufficiently big, there arises the problem of aggregation of the information provided by the examination of the dynamics of individual indicators. We considered some variants of such aggregation, i.e. of the building of aggregate financial stability indices. The first one merely represents a sum of all the signals set at moment t:
It is clear, however, that this index falls short of factoring in numerous factors. For example, the probability of financial instability can grow, but that does not mean that all indicators would simultaneously set the signal. That is why to monitor a gradual accumulation of problems in the economy, it is suggested employing the following index, too:
where j t s t S ,  equals 1, should indicator j set signal at least once in s months prior to moment t . Parameter s is set exogenously; proceeding from our premise that the crisis symptoms should manifest themselves, as a minimum, over three months prior to its start, we will assume that s equals 3.
The above two indexes do not fully use the information obtained while building the threshold values of the leading indicators, as they fail to take into account their individual forecast accuracy rates. It would be a logical way to factor this information in by weighing individual indicators with the use of values that equal the excess of the conditional probability of the rise of financial instability, in the event they have set the signal, over the unconditional one:
After calculating the values the indices posted between July 1995 and December 2006, we tested
of the rise of financial instability under different values posted by the indices:
where I -the lower margin of the interval for which the probability of the rise of financial instability is computed; I -the upper margin of this interval; A equals the number of cases when the index value found itself within the interval ) ; [ I I and a crisis burst out within the next three months; B equals the number of cases when the index value was in the same interval, but no crisis occurred over the next three months.
To test the prognostic power of the indices, we suggest testing the bias of empirical probabilities of the rise of financial instability t P from actual probabilities, under which we will understand values of the dummy variable t R , which takes form 1 within three months prior to the crisis and 0 -in the other cases. Accordingly, the following indicator can be calculated for each index:
where } 3 ; 2 ; 1 {  k depicts an index for which the prognostic power is calculated, while T equals the number of observations. It can be noted from Table 5 that it is the aggregate index, which factors in each indicator's "operational capacity", that allows one to forecast a looming financial instability. It forecasts it more accurately than any leading indicator, and its employment appears notably more efficient than the value of the unconditional probability of financial instability. Meanwhile, it appears appropriate to employ all three aggregate indices to examine the situation in the financial sector.
Monitoring of Financial Stability in RF in the 4 th Quarter 2008
Results of the employment of the quantitative analysis methodology are presented in Table 6 . It contains the values of the leading indicators registered between the 2nd and the 4th quarters 2008, their threshold values. As well, the Table reflects whether or not they set the signal. When compared with the 3rd quarter 2008, the probability of the rise of the financial crisis grew notably in the next quarter. Negative trends were on the rise in Russia's financial sector -five out of 13 indicators gave signals in different months of the quarter -namely, gold and forex reserves, the index of pressure on the forex market, domestic credit in real terms, export, and capital flight. Such a big number of indicators setting the signal was noted for the first time since March 2004 (prior to the crisis of confidence in Russia's banking system). But at the time such a situation was noted just over one month, while results of the most recent monitoring evidenced that as many as five indicators signaled the upcoming turmoil in November and December. Such a state of the system of financial stability indicators was noted just on the eve of the 1998 crisis. Meanwhile, let us note that it was the indicators that carried the least weight in the financial instability index that set the signal. However, there is every reason to believe that the situation in Russia's financial sector may further aggravate over time.
The period of late 2008-early 2009 has highlighted a significant magnitude of the economic crisis that battered the country. Meanwhile, thanks to the accumulated reserves and the national monetary authorities' timely reaction, the government has by far avoided a mass bankruptcy of credit organizations and exodus of their customers. But the state of the system of financial stability indicators speaks in favor of hard times facing Russia's financial system in the mediumterm.
We fixed the state of the system of leading indicators which corresponds to some 40% probability of growth in the magnitude of financial instability over the upcoming 1-2 quarters. This result evidences that the probability of the further aggravation of the situation in the financial sector and, consequently, in the real sector may remain high over the first half 2009.
Conclusions
The findings referenced to in the present paper allow one to argue that both theoretical and practical research prove there is a possibility for building indicators that enable experts to conduct a timely forecasting of the rise of financial instability. International experience demonstrates that the financial stability indicators can be successfully employed to forecast the rise of financial instability. Our examination of approaches to forecasts of financial turmoil allowed us to compile a theoretically substantiated list of indicators whose efficiency was first tested on the Russian financial market. The list comprises such indicators as the real exchange rate, GDP growth rate, dynamic of the domestic lending and money supply, change in consumer prices, terms of trade, among others. The statistical testing of the said indicators offers the possibility to forecast the rise of financial instability with a probability rate being in excess of an unconditional probability of the rise of financial instability. Development of a system of the financial instability leading indicators for a specific country, rather than a group of countries, allows a considerable increase in the indicators' efficiency, which appears particularly important, should economic agents employ the suggested methodology for the sake of decision making. The fact of the matter is, while analyzing a given country's financial market, it becomes plausible to consider its specificity and adjust threshold values of the leading indicators accordingly. For Russia, it is the balance of the current account of the balance of payments, the real interest rate, the money supply to gold and forex reserves ratio, the Rb. real effective exchange rate and "excess" money supply in real terms that became the most efficient indicators. The paper suggests original aggregate financial stability indices in RF, using which one can get a quantitative assessment of the probability of the rise of financial instability. Employment of the suggested methodology for the sake of evaluation of financial stability in the 4 th quarter 2008 demonstrated that five out of thirteen indicators set the signal of a high probability of the rise of the crisis. Those were: gold and forex reserves, the index of pressure on the forex market, domestic credit in real terms, export, and capital flight. Such a shape of the harbinger indicator system matches corresponds to some 40% probability of the rise of financial instability within the future one-two quarters. Given the negative trends in the economy, we estimate the probability of aggravation of the financial crisis in RF in 2009 as being a high one, particularly if the state of affairs in the foreign trade area is going to worsen further on.
